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Abstract. Machine Learning is successful in many applications including securing a network from unseen attack. The application of
learning algorithm for detecting anomaly in a Network has been fundamental since few years. With increasing use of machine learning
techniques it has become important to study to what extent it is good to be dependent on them. Altogether a different discipline called
‘Adversarial Learning’ have come up as a separate dimension of study. The work in this paper is to test the robustness of online machine
learning based IDS to carefully crafted packets by attacker called poison packets. The objective is to observe how a remote attacker can deviate
the normal behavior of machine learning based classifier in the IDS by injecting the network with carefully crafted packets externally, that may
seem normal by the classification algorithm and the instance made as part of its training set.  This  behavior  eventually  can  lead  to  poisoned
learning by the classification algorithm in the long run, resulting in misclassification of true attack instances. This work explores one such
approach with SOM and SVM as the online learning based classification algorithms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion Detection and Prevention systems (IDS/IPS) are
one of the critical components of the network of an
organization or an institution. Even though IDS involving
machine learning have not been of much practical
considerations in a real network but still they have proven
effective to withstand future unseen attacks. Much of the
research work have also been focused on detecting online
network attacks apart from detecting off line attacks by
analyzing the log data or offline data. Till date a number of IDS
systems are designed and developed based on many different
machine learning techniques. Most of these techniques are used
as a classifier to normal and attack packets. Literature study
also portrays that some IDS are based on single learning
techniques such as Genetic Algorithm , Artificial Neural
Network etc , while most others involve multiple learning
involving the process of ensemble techniques. However, the
accuracy of such learning algorithms depends on the type and
amount of training data considered. Bio inspired algorithms are
also coming up in recent times[48,49,53]. Recently online
statistical machine learning have also become an important and
useful approach to IDS. In such cases the learning is
periodically retrained on the online data for better classification
results i.e every new incoming packet is initially classified by
the classifier either as normal or anomaly. If the packet turns
out to be normal than it becomes part of future training set.
This behavior of learning have been exploited by adversaries
very well. The adversaries with minimum knowledge of the
training data set used crafted data in such a way that the
classifier may treat it as normal but in the long run may lead to
a poison attack. In this paper the proposed model of online IDS
by Lee, Seungmin, Gisung Kim et.al [1] have been adopted as
a part of study due to high accuracy claim and is tested on
NSL KDD data set[2]. The model was later subjected to
poison learning and results were analyzed. The outline of this
paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines different machine
learning techniques used in IDS. Section 3 outlines challenges
of using machine learning. Section 4 outlines the taxonomy of
attacks against IDS. Section 5 outlines the referred model.
Section 6 outlines the proposed framework and algorithm.
Section 7 discusses the experimental setup, results and
analysis. Section 8 proposes a mathematical equation
representation corresponding to the number of crafted poison
instances. Section 9 discuss the class imbalance consideration
followed by Section 10 that discuss the proposed solution that
addresses the presented problem and finally followed by
conclusion in Section 11.
2. Popular machine learning techniques used in IDS
2.1Artificial Neural Network
Artificial Neural Network is information processing unit
which mimic the neurons of human brain[3]. An Artificial
Neural Network consists layer of neurons categorized into
input , hidden and output layer[4]. The neural network IDS
trained on KDD data set have following three phases[5].
a) Automated parsers to transform raw TCP/IP data into
set of vector values fed as input to the neural model.
b) Training: Neural Network model is trained on
different network ‘normal’ and ‘attack’ values. Input
corresponding to KDD data set have 41 features and
the output corresponds to either attack(22 different
types) or normal.
c) Testing:- Validation on the Test Data for further
enhancing the neural model for better classification.
Different validation technique such as k-cross
validation are adopted at different times.
Some of the recent work using Artificial Neural Network can
be found in the following papers[14,15,16].
2.2 Support Vector Machines
Developed by Cortes & Vapnik originally for learning two
class discriminant functions from a set of training examples.
SVM basically features the following [6,7].
a) Class separation:- Seek for the optimal plane that
separates the points of the two plane also known as
support vectors by maximum distance.
b) Overlapping classes:- The influence of data points
falling on the wrong side of the planes are weighted
down.
c) Non linearity :- The data points that cannot be
distinctly separated linearly are transformed into a
higher dimensional plane where they become
separable.
d) Problem Solution :-Representing the entire task as
quadratic optimization problem that that becomes
solvable by some known techniques.
Some of the recent work using SVM in IDS can be found in the
following papers[17,18,19].
2.3 Self Organizing Map
This particular learning is inspired from biological neural
model like that of ANN. However, it involves both
competitive and correlative learning[8]. Whenever an
input is presented to the network model , the neurons
compete among themselves and the neuron with closest
similarity claims the input and becomes the winner. The
winner strengthen his weight with the input. This
mechanism spreads to neighbors in Gaussian distribution.
The core objective is to reduce the dimension of data
visualization. Some of the recent work using SOM In IDS
can be found in the following papers[20,21,22].
2.4 Decision Trees
Given a set of instances , Decision tree classify the
instances by sorting them down the tree starting from the
root and ending in a leaf of the tree. A attribute of an
instance is represented as a node of the tree and each
branch descending from the node corresponds to one of
the possible values of the attribute. This type of learning
is mostly used in cases where instances can be
represented by set of attribute and value pairs, the output
of the target function is not continuous and map to a
discrete set of values, considerations of possible errors in
the training set and missing values in the training
set[9].Some of the recent work using Decision Tree in
IDS can be found in the following papers[23,24,25].
2.5 Naive Bayes Classifier
NaiveBayes Classifier is a probabilistic classifier. This
type of classifier outputs a value p(y|x) i.e probability of
y given x. The computation can be done in two ways.
Firstly , learning and applying the function that computes
the class posterior(y|x) and this is called a discriminative
process, because given set of instances it
discriminates between different classes.The other
alternative is to learn the class conditional density p(x|y)
for each value of y and to learn the class priors p(y) , then
one can apply the Bayes rule to compute the posterior[10].
The above is called generative model because for each
possible class y , the feature vector x is generated. The
advantage of using classifiers with probabilistic output
are “reject option”, where the classification is refused if
the prediction is uncertain , “changing utility function” ,
where risk can be minimized by combining the
probability distribution with an utility function,
“compensating for class imbalance”, where one class is
rare than the other(scaled likelihood trick).Some of the
recent work using Naive Bayes in IDS can be found in
the following papers[26,27,28].
2.6 Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic uses a membership function to indicate
degree of belonging of an attribute to a more than one
class. It is difficulty to draw a strict boundary between
normal and attack and hence instances can be assigned
varying degree of normal or attack and for this reason
fuzzy is a big choice for designing Intrusion Detection
System. With fuzzy it becomes possible to model small
deviations to keep false positives/negatives small. The
generic form of the fuzzy rule can be represented as
follows
IF condition THEN conclusion [weight].
Condition is fuzzy expression defined using fuzzy logic
operators fuzzy AND etc, conclusion is an atomic
expression and weight is a set of real number [0,1], that
portrays the confidence of the rule[11].Some of the recent
work using Fuzzy systems in IDS can be found in the
following papers[29,30,31].
2.7 Radial Basis Function
Radial Function are altogether a different type of function
where the response decreases or increases monotonically
with distance from a point of reference or central point.
One example of such function is Gaussian as shown
below
h(x)=exp(-(x-c)2/r2) , where c is the center and r is the
radius.
Radial basis function network (RBF) are associated with
radial functions as shown below in the figure[12].Some
of the recent work using Radial Basis Function in IDS
can be found in the following papers[32,22,34].
Fig 1: Each component in input vector feed
to m basis functions and whose outputs are linearly
combined.
2.8 KMeans Clustering
This algorithm is used to classify objects into ‘k’ number
of clusters , based on common features of the objects.
The similarity value is computed by considering and
minimizing the sum of squares of distances between data
points and the corresponding cluster centroid[13].Some
of the recent work using k Means clustering in IDS can
be found in the following papers[35,36,37]
3. CHALLENGES IN USING MACHINE LEARNING
Machine Learning have proved to be result promising and
many companies such as Amazon uses machine learning for
meeting different objectives. However, the success of using
machine learning depends on lot many factors of which few are
listed below.
3.1 Training Data (Explicit and Implicit)
Training data used in a learning algorithm can be broadly
newly categorized into implicit feedback data and explicit
feedback data. In explicit feedback data, feature vector
corresponding to a message packet is explicitly confirmed as
an attack or normal without much difficulty , and
correspondingly used to train the learning algorithm. However,
in implicit feedback, data features might not be possible to
immediately be classified as normal or anomaly because more
attributes value might resemble a normal data but overall
feature vector or set of features vector might correspond to an
anomaly. Such “critical tag” need to be considered with utmost
care.
3.2 High Cost Errors
Running an IDS with even a very small rate of false
classification might come with high risk to the organization or
institution. Falsely classified as Negative might end up in a
remote machine gaining access to the internal network and
thereby rendering the entire network non functional. The
objective would be to design learning algorithms that could
ideally make “False Positive” and “False Negative” parameters
approximately approach to zero value.
3.3 Rule Generation
For a message or for a given source whose feature vector is
classified as abnormal it is critical to judge whether the
abnormality corresponds to an attack or a behavior deviating
from normal but not an attack. More critical in such cases is
automatic rule generation corresponding the feature set of the
message or originating source.
3.4 Proper interpretation of traffic over time.
The variability in the network traffic parameters such as
volume of traffic , bandwidth consumption , duration of
connections , number of connections can make things more
critical in operational environment. Adding to the mentioned
facts diversity can also be on the application parameters of the
messages, nature of protocols and attribute values of different
headers fields. Question arises here is the duration for which a
given connection or the network should be monitored or how
long duration traffic should be aggregated for evaluation.
Application layer DoS attack occurs in slow rate and don’t
generate massive amount of traffic.
3.5 Data set Hindrance.
The data set that are publicly available such as KDD Cup
1999, NSL-KDD [38,39] are almost a decade old. Learning
algorithms are still trained on these existing old data sets which
fails to incorporate feature vector of recent attacks such as
RUDY[R-U-Dead-Yet]. The alternative could be repository of
self monitored network . However , this could be a complicated
task due to non accessibility to an appropriate sized network.
4. ATTACKS AGAINST MACHINE LEARNING BASED IDS
Even though Machine Learning algorithms have been
successful in proving better results , however they are never
always secure[59].An adversary might always seek to explore
loopholes for rendering the learning by the algorithm futile.
The following outlines properties for analyzing attacks against
Machine Learning based IDS as discussed in [41,54].
A. Influence
i. Causative
ii. Exploratory
B. Security Violation
i. Integrity
ii. Availability
iii. Privacy
C. Specificity
i. Targeted
ii. Indiscriminate
The entire model of securing learning algorithms can be
framed as a game between the attacker and the learning model.
The attacker can poison the learning by manipulating the
training instances.
A.A. Causative Attack : In this type of attack the adversary
influences the training instances[60]. The degree of
influence over the attributes of the data may vary based
on the amount of access an attacker might have. If the
attacker is aware of the truth that online instances are
considered by the learning for evolution, he can exploit
this fact and frame instances accordingly to gradually
deviate the learning towards miss classification.
‘Allergy’ attack, ‘Red herring’ attacks are few to be
mentioned.
A.B. Exploratory Attack: In this type of attack, the attacker
crafts intrusions to successfully evade the classifier.
Here the direct influence on the classifier is not
performed. Here the attributes of normal traffic are
exploited to form attack vector mimicking a normal
vector. If the newly framed vector is successful in
evading the classifier, then therein lies the
consequences. It might so happen that the classifier
considers this new instance for future learning and as a
result eventually, the learning of the classifier can be
deviated from the normal value.
5. REFERRED MODEL
Literature survey demonstrates numerous contribution on
using machine learning techniques for successful intrusion
detection. Some of the latest work can be found in [42, 43, 44,
45]. In our first work, we have adopted a section of the model
proposed in [46]. The authors in the paper have proposed a
novel framework for fully unsupervised training and online
anomaly detection. Initially a model is constructed and
eventually the model evolves with the status of online data.
Fig. 2 shows the overview of the proposed model. The
framework consists of three phases. The first phase consists of
training the classification algorithm. In this phase the weight
vector of a synaptic connection is adjusted by injecting the
training set as input.
Fig2: Proposed Framework by Lee et.al in [46].
Once there is a wining neuron, the corresponding weight
of the neuron and its neighbors defined by a neighborhood
function is updated. In the second phase, the weight vector of
the matured SOM is clustered and the centroid of an attack
cluster is updated resulting in change in the boundary of the
clusters. In the final phase, the normal is further split into a
new attack cluster. The three phases are described below.
Phase 1: Remodeling the Network Structure and Size.
Whenever a new instance is fed as input, the Euclidean
distance of the input vector with the all the weight vectors is
computed. Whoever neuron have this minimum value ,
becomes the winning neuron.
If | x - WBMU | < µ ,
Where µ is the distance threshold.
If the above situation holds , the weights of the winning neuron
and its neighbors are updated as follows
Wj(t+1)= Wj(t) + ή {x- Wj(t) }, ------------- (1)
Where ή is the learning rate and decreases monotonically with
time.
The wining neuron (BMU-Best Matching Unit) if it belongs to
a normal cluster, the data falls out to be normal and vice versa.
Phase 2: Updating the centroid of the attack cluster
In this phase the centroid of the attack cluster is updated if the
following condition is met.
i.e the sum total of the difference of the weight at a given time
‘t’ and the initial time t0 exceeds threshold value θ and ‘m’ is
the number of units belonging to the attack cluster.
Phase 3: Splitting the normal cluster
If nth vector is represented by xn and ‘B’ represent a Normal
cluster. Let B1 and B2 represent the split cluster from B. Let µi
be the centroid of the cluster ‘i’ and “N’ represent the recent
data points that are at a distance greater than distance λ from µB.
From the direction of attack clusters , if the direction of the
number of data located is different and covers a portion ‘y’ of
N, then k-means clustering with value of k=2 is executed on
the normal cluster ‘B’ when SS1/SS2 > β.
Here SS1 = ΣXn€ B | xn - µB|2 and
SS2=Σxn€ B1| xn - µB1|2+ Σxn€ B2| xn - µB2|2
The results after implementation of the said model were
promising and is shown in the below figure.
Fig 3: Result of the offline model trained on SOM.
6. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Adopting as inspiration the model referred in section V, the
proposed model of implementation is shown below. The
proposed work is divided into the following phases
i. Preprocessing the dataset
ii. Developing the training model
iii. Poisoning the learned model
i. Preprocessing the dataset.
The dataset adopted for training and testing is NSL-KDD.
NSL-KDD have following advantage over KDD dataset
a) Due to absence of redundant item in the dataset , the
learning do not become bias.
b) The number of selected records of each type of attack
is proportional to the number of records in KDD’99.
In the first phase the dataset is preprocessed and made
ready for training the learning model namely SOM & SVM.
When the training set is ready ,the learning model is adopted in
the second phase and is trained by using the training set. Once
the learning is matured, than it is tested with poison instances
in the third phase. The proposed work flow of training the
models is shown in the Figure 4. NSL-KDD dataset have
several non-numeric attribute values. Non numeric data cannot
be adopted for training the adopted learning models. Therefore
the non numeric data is first transformed into numeric
representation and the dataset is made ready for training.
Random number of lines from the KDD dataset is adopted as
part of the training set. The column attributes are normalized
and mapped into the interval [0,1] using min-max
normalization approach. SOM is used in numerical value and
in the same range. The equation for min-max normalization
used is
Z=x-max(x)/{max(x) – min(x)}
ii. Developing the Training Model
The proposed algorithm for training the model is shown in
Figure 6. The corresponding flow chart representation is shown
in Figure 4. As shown in Algorithm , the input is the training
set and the output is the learned model. Every instance from the
training set is retrieved, preprocessed and later becomes a part
of final training set. Once the training set is ready, either of the
learning model can be adopted for training. If the learning
model adopted is SOM ,a grid of size 20x20 units is created
and the units are initialized with random weight values. For
every wining unit, the corresponding weight is updated as
shown in the Algorithm. The above process continuous until
the map is converged. Whereas ,if the learning model is SVM,
a kernel function is selected for training the model. In Fig 6 the
linear kernel approach is shown. In such approach the objective
is to find the linear hyperplane such that the support vectors of
both the class are maximally separated out from each other.
iii. Poisoning the learning model
The proposed algorithm for poisoning the learning model is
shown in Fig 7. The corresponding flow chart representation is
shown in Figure 5. Scapy is used to build custom packets and
these packets are injected into the real network traffic. The IDS
sensor running in the network captures these packets for further
processing. The feature vector of each packet is extracted and
fed to the classification algorithm. If the feature vector of the
extracted packet is classified as 'Normal', the feature is added
Fig 4: Training the learning model
Fig 5: Proposed flow chart for poison learning
to the existing training set and becomes part of future
training. If it is classified as an attack it is discarded.
The attribute values of anomaly instances in NSL-KDD is
observed and packets are framed accordingly. Most of the other
attributes value resembles that of normal feature set.
Fig 6: Algorithm of Training the learning model
This is done to observe the change in behavior of the
classification process and variance in the detection rate and
other parameters. In Fig 7, w is the set of instances. Every
instance from w is preprocessed and added to the training set T
until T is ready. Once T is ready, the learning algorithm is
chosen in step 5. Tm is the final trained model. The attacker
crafts a packet Tp and injects it into the network. If Tm is
classified as normal, it becomes part of future training set T.
Game theory formulation:To ensure a high secure behavior in
machine learning based IDS, the learning algorithm and its
classification behavior can be portrayed as a game between the
attacker and the defender. Let the attackers interest of
corrupted training and evaluated data be Atrain and Aeval. The
game can be formulated as follows
1. Defender: Select a learning algorithm H that can be
observed as best against the observed data.
2. Attacker: Generate compromised Atrain and Aeval.
3. For learning:
a) Receive datast Dtrain with contamination from
Atrain.
b) Learn Hypothesis f <-- Dtrain
4. Evaluation:
a) Receive dataet Deval for evaluation of ‘f’ with
or without any contamination Aeval+.
b) If the classification error rate is less than
threshold accept Deval and may be considered
for future training.
7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS & ANALYSIS
The different languages and packages used for
implementation are as follows
i. Python version 2 & 3
ii. Scikit python package
iii. Ubuntu 14.
The experimental approach is divided into the following
phases
i. Train SOM and SVM and test the classification result.
ii. Poison SOM and SVM with crafted instances and
observe the variance in the result from the first
phase
The experiment was carried out in a LAN framework as
shown in Figure 8. In Figure 8, the IDS sensor is the system
running machine learning based IDS software. The attacker are
assumed to get hold of host pc0 and pc1. The maliciously
crafted packets are injected from pc0 and pc1 into the real time
traffic of the network. In the first phase of the experiment , a
SOM grid of size 20x20 is initialized and trained on NSL-KDD
dataset until the SOM grid is converged. For every input unit
the BMU(Best Matching Unit) is recorded.
Fig7: Proposed method for poisoning online learning
These BMU’s are later clustered into 20 different clusters
which universally is mapped into either a normal or an attack
cluster. Fig 9 shows the visual plane of weight vectors after
being trained with NSL KDD Data set. Different colours of the
weight vectors indicate the different clusters to which they fall.
This output is on Normal Training data i.e. before subjecting to
poison learning. The proposed flow chart to fail the model is
portrayed in Fig 5. As seen in the proposed model poison
instances are crafted by exhibiting the property “camouflage”
i.e. normal instances vectors are picked up and their attributes
values are varied in accordance with the value set of attack
vectors.
Fig 8: Experimental set up
The set of attributes that attacker picks up and can influence
externally are shown in Figure 10. Once the attacker crafts
packet instance that seemingly looks normal but eventually in
the long run may lead to a poison attack. These packets are
injected into the IDS sensor. It was observed that the IDS
sensor classified these instances as normal and therefore,
makes them part of future training set.
Fig. 9. 3D plane of the BMU falling in different clusters
[Normal Data]
The attacker exploits this behavior and gradually mislead the
learning towards miss classification of true instances One
example of tampered attribute is such as Column 26 of NSL
KDD - serror_rate(% of connections that have‘SYN’ errors to
the same host). Table 1 illustrates the result of a normal SOM
on NSL-KDD dataset. The accuracy of the detection is 85%. It
is important to note here that our objective is not to improve
on the accuracy but to observe if this accuracy value could be
influenced by poison learning. Fig 9 shows the orientation of
the BMU in SOM grid. Initially , the SOM is influenced by
changing one random attribute from Fig 10.
Fig 10: Attribute list that attacker can influence externally
The attribute value is eventually changed to values that are
observed in attack instances of NSL-KDD dataset. The crafted
instance is initially injected into the IDS sensor. The IDS
classifies the instance as normal as seen in Table 4. The set
attack cluster is empty indicating the instance is classified as
normal. This instance become part of future training set. Fig
10 demonstrated the fact of the re-orientation of the BMU
after poison learning. Here, one random attribute of the normal
instances is modified with the corresponding values of the
attack set vectors. Fig 11 demonstrates the orientation of the
BMU after four random attribute poison learning by the
normal vectors with attack set values.
Fig. 10. 3D plane of the BMU falling in different clusters
[After poison learning with one random manipulated normal
attribute with attack set values.]
Table 1: Implementation results of normal SOM
Number of training
instances
3000
Execution time with
mentioned hardware
and software details
35 hours
Total cluster into
which weight vectors
of SOM is clustered
20
Cluster indices that are
part of attack. Each
cluster consists a set of
weight vectors of the
SOM grid.
[0,2,3,5,7,8,10,11,12,1
3,14,15,16,17,18,19]
Cluster indices that are
part of normal. Each
cluster consists a set of
weight vectors of the
SOM grid.
[9,4,6,12]
Detection Rate(attack
instances)
85%
Precision 77%
Sensitivity 85%
Specificity 67%
Table 2: Implementation results after one attribute poison
Number of training
instances
3000 + 1500(poison)
Execution time with
mentioned hardware
and software details
35 hours
Total cluster into
which weight vectors
of SOM is clustered
20
Cluster indices that are
part of attack. Each
cluster consists a set of
weight vectors of the
SOM grid.
[1,2,4,7,10,12,14]
Cluster indices that are
part of normal. Each
cluster consists a set of
weight vectors of the
SOM grid.
[0,3,4,5,6,8,9,11,13]
Detection Rate(attack
instances)
83%
False Positive Rate 28%
Precision 78%
Sensitivity 83%
Specificity 71%
Fig. 11. 3D plane of the BMU falling in different clusters
[After poison learning with four random manipulated normal
attribute with attack set values.]
Table 3: Implementation results after four attribute poison
learning [attack vector attributes with normal value set].
Number of training
instances
3000 + 1500(poison)
Execution time with
mentioned hardware
and software details
34 hours
Total cluster into
which weight vectors
of SOM is clustered
20
Cluster indices that are
part of attack. Each
cluster consists a set of
weight vectors of the
SOM grid.
[1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,1
2,13,15,18,19]
Cluster indices that are
part of normal. Each
cluster consists a set of
weight vectors of the
SOM grid.
[2,18,15]
Detection Rate (attack
instances)
92%
False Positive Rate 83%
Precision 59%
Sensitivity 92%
Specificity 16%
Table 4: Crafted packets are classified as normal by the
learned IDS as result portrays no BMU falls in the Attack
Cluster.
Number of training
instances
1500
Total cluster into
which weight vectors
of SOM is clustered
20
Cluster indices that are
part of attack. Each
cluster consists a set of
weight vectors of the
SOM grid.
[]
Cluster indices that are
part of normal. Each
cluster consists a set of
weight vectors of the
SOM grid.
[0,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,1
2,13,14,15,16,17,18,19
]
Detection Rate(attack
instances)
100%
False Positive Rate 0%
Precision 100%
Sensitivity 100%
Specificity 100%
Table 1 shows the result of training the SOM in normal
circumstances. Normal circumstances here implies the that the
training instances are non-tampered i.e the feature vector set
used for training belongs to true normal and attack instances.
The size of the SOM grid is 20x20 units and as stated earlier
the weights are assigned randomly until the SOM grid is
converged with training instances. The testing instances are
than fed to the SOM grid. An output unit in the SOM grid
claims responsibility of the input instances and therefore
becomes the winning unit i.e BMU(Best Matching Unit). In
our experiment the weight vectors connecting the input unit to
the output units of the SOM grid are clustered into twenty
numbers after the training phase. Each of these clusters either
falls into attack or normal cluster. The category of the cluster
is determined by the supervised label of the training instances.
A BMU corresponding a training instance marked attack is
part of the attack cluster. From Table 1 it is clear that the total
number of clusters that falls in generic attack clusters is 16 and
that falls in generic normal cluster is 4. The converged SOM is
than tested with the training instances.With the standard
testing test of NSL-KDD dataset , the detection accuracy as
shown in Table 1 is 85%. However, we would like to restate
that the objective of the work in not to improve detection
accuracy but to discover if a learning based IDS can be
influenced externally. With this objective packets were framed
that seemed normal but eventually in the long run may lead to
an attack. Attributes whose value can be influenced externally
are already mentioned in Figure 10. Table 2 demonstrates the
result after injecting the IDS with 1500 poison instances i.e
attributes values are modified in such manner that the IDS
classify them initially as normal and eventually these instances
become part of future training by the learning algorithm. It is
observed that there have been altogether reorientation of the
weight vectors falling into normal and attack clusters. The
accuracy results have dropped from 85% to 83% as found
from the experiment. This indicates that an attacker can
externally influence an online learning and thereby bring the
future classification result of an online IDS down. Table 3
displays the result of similar experiment repeated but with
higher number of tampered attributes values. Table 4
demonstrates the result of the classification by the IDS of the
instances that are programmatically crafted that seemingly are
Table 5: Classification result of a normal SVM.
normal but are poison instances. When these instances are
injected to the IDS for classification, it is observed that the
clusters of BMU falling in the generic attack cluster is empty
and therefore all the instances are treated normal and therefore,
becomes part of future training. The detection rate is 100%
indicating all the crafted instances are very well recognized as
normal by the detection engine of the IDS. Citing as an
example one attribute value of crafted instances that was
incrementally changed was
dst_host_host_count :Number of connections from the same
host to the destination in the past 2 seconds.
We kept all other feature values(as per NSL-KDD) of a packet
same as that of a normal packet but kept slowly rising in linear
pattern the value of the above attribute. It is later observed that
the IDS eventually started to fail recognizing DoS(Denial of
Service ) attack in form of SYN flood performed from a single
machine to a target destination. The IDS started classifying all
of them eventually as normal packets. This signifies that an
attacker can plan very carefully to bypass detection of a
specific attack by an online IDS.
Apart from testing this behavior with online based IDS using
SOM as the classification tool, we also tested it with
SVM(Support Vector Machine).Support Vector Machines
have proven effective in classification of high dimensional
data with significantly bigger training instances and attributes.
SVM is trained with training set from NSL-KDD Dataset. The
implementation of SVM on training samples exhibits high
accuracy i.e the SVM perfectly classifies the training and the
testing instances. Ten thousand samples from NSL-KDD
dataset were adopted for training the SVM. Table 5
summarizes the result of the output of the SVM. The learned
SVM is tested on the NSL-KDD testing set. As seen from
Table 5, with zero false positive or false negative the detection
comes to 100%.
Figure 7 below shows the support vectors plotted in a normal
SVM trained on NSL-KDD dataset using linear kernel.
Fig 7: Support vectors in a normal SVM using linear kernel
It is observed from Figure 7 that none of the support vectors
are misclassified. Therefore , the detection rate is high.
Different colours of the panel represents instances falling to
different clusters. The support vectors are labeled in the figure.
Fig 7 shows the SVM plot with a linear kernel. Figure 8 shows
the support vectors plotted using a polynomial kernel and
Figure 9 shows the support vectors plotted using a radial basis
function. It has been observed in all the SVM plotted figures
that none of the testing instances are misclassified and the
detection rate really goes well because of large size in the
feature set as can be seen from Table 5. However, when the
SVM is trained using poison instances as discussed before,
the support vector changes as shown in Figure 10 from that of
support vectors shown in Figure 7. The accuracy of detection
Number of training instances 10000
Detection rate(attack
instances)
100%
Precision 100%
Sensitivity 100%
rate drops below 100%. This is vivid by the number of
misclassified support vectors as can be seen from Figure 10. In
normal SVM as seen in Figure 7, there were no misclassified
support vectors and therefore high detection accuracy.
Fig 8: Support vectors in a normal SVM using polynomial
kernel
Fig 9: Support vectors in a normal SVM using radial basis
function
Table 6: Support vector set in normal trained linear kernel
based SVM
Similarly, the misclassification in SVM using polynomial
kernel can be seen in Figure 11 as that from Figure 8.
Likewise, misclassification error of support vector in SVM
using radial basis function can be observed in Figure 12 from
that of Figure 9. As can be seen from Table 6, the support
vectors either falls in one of the class i.e in generic Attack or
Normal. As can be seen from the table two number of support
vectors falls in the first class and six number of support
vectors falls in the second class. As described earlier, the
framed instances are crafted keeping resemblance with the
attack set vectors of NSL KDD set. However, significant
changes in indices of support vector set compared to support
vectors in normal SOM is observed.
Fig 10: Support vectors in SVM learned using poison
(manually crafted)instances using linear kernel
Fig 11: Support vectors in SVM learned using poison
instances using polynomial kernel
Fig 12: Support vectors in SVM learned using poison
instances using radial basis function
The plot of linear indices of support vectors can be seen in
Figure 13. The density of these linear indices changes in
SVM poisoned with single and multiple attributes as can be
seen in Figure 14 & 15 respectively.
This indicates that the behavior of the learning can be
influenced by carefully crafting packets that may seem normal
but can be a potential attack in the long run. The number of
False
Positive/False
Negative
('TP', 0, 'TN', 500, 'FP', 0, 'FN', 0)
Support vector in
the first class
[5 1]
Support vector in
the second class
[ 63 282 461 588 681 0]
support vectors belonging to a given class also changes
significantly.
Table 7: Support vector set in one attribute poisoned trained
with linear kernel based SVM.
('TP', 0, 'TN', 500, 'FP', 0, 'FN', 0)
Support vector class - [8(first class), 1(second clas)]
Support vector indices set --- [100 113 179 216 390 481
605 610 0]
Table 8: Support vector set in four attributes poisoned trained
with linear kernel based SVM.
('TP', 0, 'TN', 500, 'FP', 0, 'FN', 0)
Support vector class -[7(first class), 1(second class)]
Support vector indices set --[128 177 292 356 419 787
885 0]
Fig13: In scale of 1000 [x,y axis], indices of support vectors in
normal training instances.
Fig 14: In scale of 1000 [x,y axis],Indices of support vectors
after poison learning with one random manipulated normal
attribute with attack set values
Fig 15:In scale of 1000 [x,y axis],Indices of support vectors
after poison learning with four random manipulated normal
attribute with attack set values
8. MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK
The mathematical formulation portraying the deviation in the
learning with newly injected normal and poison packets can be
derived as below:
y- inclusion rate of learning instances for normal learning.
L - unaffected Learning,ɑ - infectivity rate on learning by
malicious instances,X - set of previous malicious instances (if
any) already part of the learning set.,β - error rate in the non-
tampered Learning. The rate of change in the Learning
(gradual inclination towards poison learning) can be
formulated as follows: dL/dt = y - ɑL X - βL. The following
equation indicates how much influence the instances that are
“attack” but classified as normal and became part of future
learning set can further influence the learning: dE/dt = ɑLX -
( λ + θ)E
9. Class Imbalance in Training Set
Most of the machine learning algorithms are subjected to
imbalance problem[55,56]. There have been work to address
the imbalance problem by different researchers[57,58]. The
experiment and evaluation demonstrated in this paper is not in
relation to class imbalance problem during the training. The
training data generated in the experimental evaluation is free
of class imbalance problem. While generating the training set
almost an approximate equal number of labelled instances
from each of attack and normal set were considered. It was
also done in keeping in mind not to make the learning
algorithm victim of overfitting problem. To ensure the same
Tomek links[51] was considered. Therefore, no two examples
were considered that formed Tomek links.
10. Proposed solution to overcome the observed
problem
Training data manipulation: From the experimental evaluation
it is observed that the anomaly in the true classification is due
to incorporation of instances in the future learning set that are
otherwise classified as normal but may lead to poison learning
in the long run. Whenever, an incoming instance is classified
as normal rather than embedding this instance immediately as
a part of future training set, this instances are made part of a
temporary set. When the size of this temporary set is large the
instances of the set are made part of the training set and the
learning is made to reoccur again on this training set. Once the
learning is converged, the learning algorithm is run on
randomly picked samples from testing set of NSL-KDD
dataset. If the detection rate drops below compared to the rate
recorded before the temporary set is made part of training set,
the instances of the temporary set are ignored. Therefore, the
new training set remains same as the old training set i.e
If detection_ratenew< detection_rateold :
training_set_new = training_set_old;
Else:
training_set_new(future training set)=
training_set_old + temporary_set;
Certain methods such as RONI[52] have been proposed in
certain context such as spam classification of emails in
relevance to training data manipulation. However, in this
aspect RONI approach might fail or prove computationally
more intensive. The above proposed idea of temporary set
approach would prove effective and less computationally
intensive as the learning would not be invoked with every new
instance. However the degree of such efficiency would be
considered in the future study and experimental evaluation.
11. CONCLUSION
The above experiments demonstrates that it is possible to
influence the classification behaviour of an online based IDS
by systematically changing certain attribute values of a packet
feature set. Experimental evaluation shows that the detection
accuracy of the online IDS declines after subjected to poison
packet attacks. The experimental evaluation are significant in
the sense that it gives a understanding of the necessary steps
to be adopted for online learning based IDS for safe and
secure learning. It can be therefore concluded that machine
learning algorithms are never blindly secure and leave a scope
for analysis of such algorithms under different circumstances
[47]. If the attacker has some idea of the attributes used for
training purpose, he can play around with self-crafted
instances with different values for those attributes for
deviating the classification behavior of the learning algorithm.
This work further motivates to pick up the responsive behavior
of a Network subject to attack. One of such work undertaken
can be found in [48]. It is also observed that people have tried
to devise a different approach to achieve security at different
times [49, 50]. Therefore, there always exist an enthusiasm
among security researcher to design IDS/IPS or responsive
system that can ensure minimum casualty to the network and
organization as a whole. The experimental evaluation leaves
another scope of designing a bio inspired response system of a
network to withstand unseen attacks.
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